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In species capable of learning, including our own, individuals can modify their
behavior by some adaptive process. Important classes of behavior - mating, predation,
coalitions, trade, signaling, and division of labor - involve interactions between individuals.
The agents involved learn two things: with whom to interact and how to act. That is to say
that adaptive dynamics operates both on structure and strategy.
In an interaction individuals actualize some behavior, the behavior of the
individuals jointly determines the outcome of the interaction, and the consequences for the
individuals motivate learning. At this high level of abstraction, we can model interactions
as games. The relevant behaviors of individuals are called strategies of the game, and the
strategies of the players jointly determine their payoffs. Payoffs drive the learning
dynamics. (Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000).
If  we fix the interaction structure in this abstract scheme, we get models of the
evolution of strategies in games played on a fixed structure. An interaction structure need2
not be deterministic. In general, it can be thought of as a specification of the probabilities
of interaction with other individuals.  By far the most frequently studied interaction
structure is one in which the group of individuals is large and individuals interact at
random. That is to say that each individual has equal probability of interacting with every
other individual in the population. Among a list of virtues of this model, mathematical
tractability must come near the top. At another end of the spectrum we have models
where individuals interact with their neighbors on a torus, or a circle, or (less frequently)
some other graphical structure. [ Ellison (1993) , Nowak and May (1992), Hegselmann
(1996), Alexander (2000)] . Except in the simplest cases, these models sacrifice
mathematical tractability to gain realism, and computer simulations have played an
important role in their investigation. These two extreme models, however, can have quite
different implications for the evolution of behavior.    In large, random encounter settings
cooperators are quickly eliminated in interactions with a Prisoner's Dilemma structure.
Comparable local interaction models allow cooperators to persist  in the population.
If we fix the strategies of individuals and let the interaction structure evolve we get
a model of interaction network formation.   Evolution of structure is less well-studied than
evolution of strategies, and  is the main focus of this paper. Most current research on
theory of network formation takes the point of view that networks are modeled as graphs
or directed graphs, and network dynamics consists of making and breaking of links.
[Jackson and Watts (2002), Bala and Goyal, (2000) ]   In taking an interaction structure to
be a specification of probabilities of interaction rather than a graphical structure, we take a
more general view than most of the literature (but see Kirman (1997) for a point of view3
close to that taken here.) It is possible that learning dynamics may drive these probabilities
to zero or one and that a deterministic graphical interaction structure may crystallize out,
but this will be treated as a special case. We believe that this probabilistic approach can
give a more faithful account of both human and non-human interactions. It also makes
available a set of mathematical tools that do not fit the coarser picture of making or
breaking deterministic links in a graphical structure.
    Ultimate interest resides in the general case where structure and strategy co-
evolve. These may be modified by the same or different kinds of learning. They may
proceed at the same rate or different rates. The case where structure dynamics is slow and
strategy dynamics is fast may approximate more familiar models where strategies evolve
on a fixed interaction structure. The opposite case may be close to that of  individuals with
fixed strategies (or phenotypes) learning to network. In between, there is a very rich
territory waiting to be explored. We will close this paper with a discussion of the co-
evolution of structure and strategy a game which one of us has argued is the best simple
prototype of the problem of instituting a social contract.[Skyrms, 2004].   Whether
coevolution of structure and strategy supports or reverses the conventional wisdom about
equilibrium selection in this game, depends on the nature and relative rates of the two
learning processes.
2. Learning4
Learning can be divided into two broad categories: (1) belief learning in which the
organism forms belief or internal representations of the world and uses these to make
decisions, and  (2) reinforcement learning, where the organism increases the probability of
acts that have been rewarded and decreases the probability of those that have not been
rewarded. Ultimately the distinction may not be so clear cut, but it is useful for a
categorization of learning theories. In the simplest belief learning model, Cournot
dynamics, an individual assumes that others will do what they did last time and performs
the act that has the highest payoff on that assumption. More sophisticated individuals
might form their beliefs more carefully, by applying inductive reasoning to some or all of
the available evidence. Less confident individuals might hedge their bet on Cournot
dynamics with some probabilistic version of the rule. Strategically minded individuals
might predict the effect of their current choice on future choices of the other agents
involved, and factor this into their decision. Humans, having a very large brain, can do all
of these things but often they do not bother [Suppes and Atkinson (1960), Roth and Erev
(1995), Erev and Roth (1998), Busemeyer and Stout (2002), Yechiam, and Busemeyer
(preprint).]
  Reinforcement learning does not require a lot of effort, or a large brain, or any
brain at all. In this paper we will concentrate on reinforcement learning, although we will
also touch on other forms of learning. Specifically, we apply a mathematical model in
which the probability of an act is proportional to the accumulated rewards from
performing that act. [Herrnstein (1970), Roth and Erev (1995)]. Following Luce (1959),
the learning model can be decomposed into two parts,  a reinforcement dynamics, in which5
weights or propensities for acts evolve, and a response rule, which translates these weights
into probabilities of acts. If we let weights evolve by adding the payoff gotten to the
weight of the act chosen, and let our probabilities be equal to the normalized weights
(Luce's linear response rule), we get the basic Herrnstein-Roth-Erev dynamics.
There are alternative models of reinforcement learning that could be investigated in
this setting. In a path-breaking study, Suppes and Atkinson (1960)  applied stimulus
sampling dynamics to learning in two-person games. Borgers and Sarin (1997) have
investigated dynamics  of Bush and Mosteller (1955) dynamics in a game-theoretic setting.
Instead of the Luce's linear response rule of normalizing the weights, some models use a
logistic response rule. Bonacich and Liggett (2004) apply Bush-Mosteller learning in a
setting closely resembling our own. They get limiting results that are closely connected to
this of the discounted model of Friends II in Skyrms and Pemantle (2000).  Liggett and
Rolles (in press)  generalize the results of Bonacich and Liggett to an infinite space of
agents. We, however, will concentrate attention on the basic Herrnstein-Roth-Erev
dynamics and on a "slight" variation on it.
Erev and Roth (1997) suggest modifying the basic model by discounting the past
to take account of "forgetting". At each time period, accumulated weights are multiplied
by some positive discount factor less than one, while new reinforcements are added at full
strength. Discounting is a robust phenomenon in experimental studies of reinforcement
learning, but there seems to be a great deal of individual variability with reported discount
factors ranging from .5 to .99.  [Erev and Roth (1997), Busemeyer and Stout (2002),6
Yechiam and Busemeyer (2004), Goeree and Holt (forthcoming)].  Discounting changes
the limiting properties of the learning process radically. We will see that within the
reported range of individual variability, small variations in the discount rate can lead to
large differences in predicted observable outcomes in interactive learning situations.
3. Two-Person Games with Basic Reinforcement Learning
We begin by investigating  basic (undiscounted) reinforcement learning in simple
two-person interactions. The following model was introduced in Skyrms and Pemantle
(2000). Each day each individual in a small group wakes up and decides to visit someone.
She decides by chance, with the chance of visiting anyone else in the group being given by
normalized weights for that individual. (We can imagine the process starting with some
initial weights; they can all be set to one to start the process with random encounters.) The
person selected always accepts, and there is always time enough in the day for all selected
interactions to take place. In a group of ten, if Jane decides to visit someone and the other
nine all happen to decide to visit Jane, she has a total of ten interactions in that day. Each
interaction produces a payoff. At the end of the day, each individual updates her weights
for every other individual by adding the payoffs gotten that day from interactions with that
individual. (Obvious variations on the basic model suggest themselves, but we confine
ourselves here to just this model applied to different kinds of interactions.) Initially, we
investigate baseline cases where individuals have only the choice of with whom to interact,
and interactions always produce payoffs in the same way. Then we build on the results for7
these cases to analyze interactions in the stag hunt game, in which different agents can
have different acts and the combination of acts determines the payoffs.
Consider two games of "Making Friends." In Friends I the visitor is always treated
well, and gains a payoff of 1, while the host goes to some trouble but also enjoys the
encounter, for a net payoff of zero. In Friends II the visitor and host are both equally
reinforced, with a payoff of 1 going to each. We start each learning process with each
individual having initial weights of one for each other individual, so that our group begins
by interacting at random. It is easy to run computer simulations of the Friends I and
Friends II processes, and it is a striking feature of such simulations that in both cases non-
random interaction structure rapidly emerges. Furthermore, rerunning the processes from
the same starting point seems to generate different structure each time. In this setting, we
should expect the emergence of structure without an organizer, or even an explanation in
terms of payoff differences. The state of uniform random encounters with which we
started the system does not persist, and so must count as a very artificial state. Its use as
the fixed interaction structure in many game theoretic models is therefore extremely
suspect.
We can understand the behavior of  the Friends I process if we notice that each
individual's learning process is equivalent to a Polya urn. We can think of him as having an
urn with balls of different colors, one color for each other individual. Initially there is one
ball of each  color. A ball is chosen (and returned), the designated individual is visited.
Because visitors are always reinforced, another ball of the same color is added to the urn.8
Because only visitors are reinforced, balls are not added to the urn in any other way.
(Philosophers of science will be familiar with the Polya urn because of its equivalence with
Bayes-Laplace inductive inference.) The Polya urn converges to a limit with probability
one, but it is a random limit with uniform distribution over possible final probabilities.
Anything can happen, and nothing is favored! In Friends I the random limit is uniform for
each player, and makes the players independent. [Skyrms and Pemantle 2000, Theorem 1].
All interaction structures are possible in the limit, and the probability that the group
converges to random encounters is zero.
In Friends II, both visitor and host are reinforced and so the urns interact. If
someone visits you, you are reinforced to visit him - or to put it graphically, someone can
walk up to your door and put a ball of his color in your urn. This complicates the analysis.
Nevertheless, the final  picture is quite similar. The limiting probabilities must be
symmetric, that is to say X visits Y with the same probability that Y visits X, but subject
to this constraint and its consequences anything can happen. [Skyrms and Pemantle (2000)
Theorem 2].
So far, the theory has explained the surprising results of the simulations, but a
rather special case of Friends II provides a cautionary contrast. Suppose that there are
only three individuals. (What we are about to describe is much less likely to happen if the
number of individuals is a little larger.) Then the only way we can have symmetric visiting
probabilities is if each individual visits the other two each with probability one-half. Then
the previous theorem implies that in this case the process must converge to these9
probabilities. In simulations this sometimes happens rapidly. However, there are other
trials in which the system appears to be converging to a state in which individual A visits B
and C equally, but B and C always visit A and never each other. You can think of
individual A as "Ms. Popular." The system was observed to stay near such a state for a
long time (5,000,000 iterations of the process.)
This apparent contradiction is resolved in Pemantle and Skyrms (2005), using the
theory of stochastic approximation. For the basic Herrnstein-Roth-Erev model, there is an
underlying deterministic dynamics that can be obtained from the expected increments of
the stochastic process. This deterministic dynamics has four equilibria - one in which each
individual visits the others with equal probability and the other three having A, B, and C
respectively as "Ms. Popular." The symmetric equilibrium is strongly stable - an attractor -
while the "Ms. Popular" equilibria are unstable saddle points. The system must converge
to the symmetric equilibrium. It cannot converge to one of the unstable saddles, but if in
the initial stages of learning it wanders near a saddle it may take a long time to escape
because the vector pushing it away is very small. This is what happens in the anomalous
simulations. There is a methodological moral here that we will revisit in the next section.
Simulations may not be a reliable guide to limiting behavior and limiting behavior is not
necessarily all that is of interest.
      The Making Friends games provide building blocks for analyzing learning dynamics
where the interactions are games with non-trivial strategies. Consider the two-person Stag
Hunt. Individuals are either Stag Hunters or Hare Hunters. If a Stag Hunter interacts with10
a Hare Hunter no Stag is caught and the Stag Hunter gets zero payoff. If a Stag Hunter
interacts with another Stag Hunter the Stag is likely caught and the hunters each get a
payoff of one. Hare Hunting requires no cooperation, and its practitioners get a payoff of
.75 in any case. The game is of special interest for social theory because cooperation is
both mutually beneficial and an equilibrium, but it is risky [Skyrms (2004)]. In game
theoretic terminology, Stag hunting is payoff dominant and Hare hunting is risk dominant.
In a large population composed of half Stag Hunters and half Hare Hunters with random
interactions between individuals, the Hare Hunters would get an average payoff of .75
while the Stag Hunters would only get an average payoff of .50. The conventional wisdom
is that in the long run evolution will strongly favor Hare hunting, but we say that one
should consider the possibility that the players learn to network.
     We use exactly the same model as before, except that the payoffs are now determined
by the individuals' types or strategies: Hunt Stag or Hunt Hare. We start with an even
number of Stag Hunters and Hare Hunters. Theory predicts that, in the limit, Stag Hunters
always visit Stag Hunters and Hare Hunters always visit Hare Hunters [Skyrms and
Pemantle (2000) Th. 6]. Simulation confirms that such a state is approached rapidly.
Although on rational choice grounds Hare Hunters "should not care" whom they visit,
they cease to be reinforced by visits from Stag Hunters after Stag Hunters learn not to
visit them. Hare Hunters continue to be visited by other Hare Hunters, so all the
differential learning for Hare Hunters takes place when they are hosts rather than visitors.
Once learning has sorted out Stag Hunters and Hare Hunters so that each group only11
interacts with its own members, each is playing Friends II with itself and previous results
characterize within-group interaction structure.
Now Stag Hunters prosper. Was it implausible to think that Stag Hunters might
find a way to get together? If they were sophisticated, well-informed, optimizing agents
they would have gotten together right away! Our point is that it doesn't take much for
Stag Hunters to get together. A little bit of reinforcement learning is enough.
4. Clique Formation with Discounting the Past
Adding a little discounting of the past is a natural and seemingly modest
modification of the reinforcement process. However, it drastically alters the limiting
behavior of learning. If the Polya urn, which we used in the analysis of Friends I, is
modified by discounting the past the limiting result is that after some time (can't say when)
there will be one color (can't say which) that will always be picked. Discounting the past,
no matter how little the discounting, leads to deterministic outcomes. This is also true
when we learn to network. Discounting the past leads to the formation of cliques, whose
members never interact with members of alternative cliques. Why then, did we even bother
to study  learning without discounting? We will see that
if discounting is small enough, learning with discounting may, for long periods of time,
behave like learning without discounting.12
The effects of adding discounting to the learning process are already apparent in
two-person interactions [Skyrms and Pemantle (2000)], but they are more interesting in
multi-person interactions. Here we discuss two three-person interactions, Three's
Company (a uniform reinforcement counterpart to Friends II), and a Three-Person version
of the Stag Hunt. Every day, each individual picks two other individuals to visit to have a
three-person interaction. The probability of picking a pair of individuals is taken to be
proportional to the product of their weights. The payoff that an individual receives from a
three-person interaction is added to her weights for each of the other two participants. We
again start the learning process with random interaction. Everyone begins having weight
one for everyone else.
In Three's Company, as in Friends II, everyone is always reinforced in every
interaction. Everyone gets a payoff of one. No matter what the discount rate, the limiting
result of discounted learning is clique formation. For a population size of six or more, the
population will break up into cliques of size 3, 4, or 5. Each member of a given clique
chooses each other member of that clique with positive limiting relative frequency. For
each member of a clique, there is a finite time after which she does not choose outsiders.
All such cliques - that is each partition of the population into sets of size 3, 4, and 5, has
positive probability of occurring. [Pemantle and Skyrms (in press) Th. 4.1.]
Simulations at a discount rate of .5 conform to theory. A population of 6 always
broke into two cliques of size 3, with no interactions between cliques. As we discount less
- keeping more of the past weights - we see a rapid shift in results. Multiplying past13
weights by .6, led to formation of 2 cliques in 994/1000 trials; by .7 in 13/1000; by .8 in
none.  (We ran the process for 1,000,000 time steps and rounded interaction probabilities
to two decimal places.) Writing the discount factor by which past payoffs are multiplied as
(1-x), we can say that simulation says that clique formation occurs reliably for large x, but
not at all for small x  with a large transition taking place between x=.4 and x=.3. The
theory says that clique formation occurs for any positive x.
This apparent conflict between theory and simulation is resolved in Pemantle and
Skyrms (2004), where it is shown that time to clique formation increases exponentially in
1/x as the discount factor (1-x) approaches 1.  The behavior of the process for observable
finite sequences of iterations is highly sensitive to the discount parameter, within ranges
that fall within the individual variability that has been reported in the experimental
literature. When x is close to 1, discounted reinforcement learning behaves for long
periods of time like undiscounted learning in which clique formation almost never occurs.
Three's Company, like Friends II, is important because it arises naturally in the
analysis of less trivial interactions. Consider a Three-Player Stag Hunt [Pemantle and
Skyrms (in press)]. Pairs of individuals are chosen, and weights evolve, just as in Three's
Company, but the payoffs depend on the types of players. If three Stag Hunters interact,
they all get a payoff of 4, but a Stag Hunter who has at least one Hare Hunter in his trio
gets nothing.  (In a random encounter setting, Stag Hunting is here even more risky that in
the two person case.) Hare hunters always get a payoff of 3.14
In the limit Stag Hunters learn to always visit other Stag Hunters but, unlike some
other limiting results we have discussed, this one is attained very rapidly. With 6 Stag
Hunters and 6 Hare Hunters and a discount rate of .5, the probability that a stag hunter
will visit a hare hunter usually drops below half a percent in 25 interactions. In 50
iterations this always happened in 1000 trials, and this remains true for values of x
between .5 and .1. For x=.01, 100 iterations suffices and 200 iterations are enough if
x=.001.
Once Stag Hunters learn to visit Stag Hunters, they are essentially playing a game
of Three's Company among themselves. They may be visited by Hare Hunters, but these
visits produce no reinforcement for the Stag Hunters and so do not alter their weights.
Stag Hunters then form cliques of size 3, 4, or 5 among themselves. This will take a long
time if the past is only slightly discounted.
There is a tendency for Hare Hunters to learn to visit Hare Hunters after the Stag
Hunters learn not to visit them, but because of the discounting it is possible for a Hare
Hunter to be frozen in a state of visiting one or two Stag Hunters. This is a real possibility
when the past is heavily discounted. At x=.5, at least one Hare Hunter interacted with a
Stag Hunter (after 10,000 iterations) in 384 out of 1000 trials. This dropped to 6/1000 for
x = .2 and to 0 for x =.1. Hare Hunters who are no trapped into interactions with Stag
Hunters eventually end up playing Three's Company among themselves and also form
cliques of size 3, 4, and 5.15
5. Coevolution of Structure and Strategy
So far we have concentrated on the dynamics of  interaction, because we believe
that it has not received as much attention as it deserves. The full story involves co-
evolution of both interaction structure and strategy. Depending on the application, these
may involve the same or different adaptive dynamics and they may evolve at the same or
different rates. We will illustrate this with two different treatments of the two-person Stag
Hunt.
To the two-person Stag Hunt of section 3, we add a strategy revision process
based on imitation. This reinforcement-imitation model was discussed in Skyrms and
Pemantle (2000). With some specified probability, an individual wakes up, looks around
the whole group, and if some strategy is prospering more than his own, switches to it.
Individual's probabilities are independent.  If imitation is fast relative to structure
dynamics, it operates while individuals interact more or less at random and Hare Hunters
will take over more often than not. If imitation is slow, stag hunters find each other and
prosper, and then imitation slowly converts Hare Hunters to Stag Hunters (who quickly
learn to interact with other Stag Hunters).16
Simulations show that in intermediate cases, timing can make all the difference. We
start with structure weights equal to 1 and  vary the relative rates of the dynamics by
varying the imitation probability. With "fast" imitation (pr = .1) 78% of the trials ended up
with everyone converted to Hare Hunting and 22% ended up with everyone converted to
Stag Hunting.  Slower imitation (pr = .01) almost reversed the numbers, with 71% of the
trials ending up All Stag and 29% ending up All Hare. Fluid network structure coupled
with slow strategy revision reverses the orthodox prediction that Hare Hunting (the risk
dominant equilibrium) will take over.
(This conclusion remains unaffected if we add discounting to the learning dynamics
for interaction structure. Discounting the past simply means that Stag Hunters find each
other more rapidly. No matter how Hare Hunters end up, Stag Hunters are more
prosperous. Imitation converts Hare Hunters to Stag Hunters.)
The foregoing model illustrates the combined action of two different dynamics,
reinforcement learning for interaction structure and imitation for strategy revision. What
happens if both processes are driven by reinforcement learning? In particular, we would
like to know whether the relative rates of structure and strategy dynamics still make the
same difference between Stag Hunting and Hare Hunting. In this Double Reinforcement
model, each individual has two weight vectors, one for interaction propensities and one
for propensities to either Hunt Stag or Hunt Hare. Probabilities for whom to visit and
what to do are both gotten by normalizing the appropriate weights. Weights are updated
by adding the payoff from an interaction to both the weight for the individual involved and17
to the weight for the action taken. Relative rates of the two learning processes can be
manipulated by changing the magnitude of the initial weights.
In the previous models we started the population off with some Stag Hunters and
some Hare Hunters. That point of view is no longer correct. The only way one could be
deterministically a Stag Hunter would be if he started out with zero weight for Hare
Hunting, and then he could never learn to hunt Stag. We have to start out individuals with
varying propensities to hunt Hare and Stag. There are various interesting choices that
might be made here; we will report some simulation results for one. We start the a group
of 10, with 2 confirmed Stag Hunters (weight 100 for Stag, 1 for Hare), 2 confirmed Hare
Hunters (weight 100 for Hare, 1 for Stag), and 6 undecided guys (weights 1 for Stag and
1 for Hare. Initial weights for interaction structure were all equal, but their magnitude was
varied from .001 to 10, in order to vary the relative rates of learning structure and
strategy. The percent of 10,000 trials that ended up All Stag or All Hare (after 1,000,000
iterations) for these various settings are shown in figure 1. As before, fluid interaction
structure and slow strategy adaptation favor Stag Hunting, while the reverse combination
favors Hare Hunting.
(figure 1 here)
In both reinforcement-imitation and double reinforcement models of the
coevolution of structure and strategy a fluid network structure shifts the balance form the
risk dominant Hare Hunting equilibrium to the cooperative Stag Hunt.18
6.  Why Dynamics?
Classical, pre-dynamic,  game theory  would approach the problem differently. The
whole group of 10 individuals is playing a 10-person game. A move consists in choosing
both a person to play with and a strategy. We can just identify the Nash equilibria of this
large game. None are strict. The pure equilibria fall into two classes. One class has
everyone hunting Stag and every possible interaction structure. The other has everyone
hunting Hare and every possible interaction possible interaction structure. (There are also
mixed equilibria with every possible interaction structure.)  From this point of view,
interaction structure does not seem very important. If you ignore dynamics you miss a lot.19
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